As Brian Tamanaha writes at Balkinization, law school debt levels continue their relentless climb. The latest figures from US News show that, among 2012 graduates, the average amount borrowed for law school exceeded $150,000 at six law schools. Only one of those schools (Northwestern) ranks among the top fifteen law schools; one other (American) ranks 56th. The other four (Thomas Jefferson, California Western, Phoenix, and New York Law School) lie in the unranked fourth tier.
As Brian’s post shows, the job outcomes at five of these schools (all but Northwestern) are dismal. Less than 40% of the students at these schools obtained full-time jobs that required bar admission and would last at least one year. Even at Northwestern, only 77% of the class met that mark. How can all of the graduates with part-time, temporary, or non-lawyering jobs possibly pay off more than $150,000 in debt–plus all of the accrued interest on that debt? What calculations can justify attending most law schools at that debt-to-outcome ratio?
The problem, of course, reaches far beyond these six schools. They are at the top of the debt ladder, but most other law schools are close behind. 123 law schools, well over half of the 193 listed schools, reported average amounts borrowed that exceeded $100,000. Even Irvine law school’s first graduates, who paid no tuition for their three years of law school, reported debt. More than two-thirds (68%) of Irvine’s initial class incurred debt, borrowing an average of $49,602 for their “free” law school ride. Remarkably, that figure gave Irvine the second lowest average debt load among the 193 law schools.
When students borrow almost $50,000 to attend law school, even without paying tuition, we have to re-think the way we structure legal education.
A “Coalition of Concerned Colleagues,” which includes me, has submitted a letter to the ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal Education. Although I can claim no credit for drafting the letter, I think it offers a succinct statement of the economic distress faced by law students and recent graduates: tuition has climbed dramatically, scholarships rarely address need, entry-level jobs have contracted, and salaries in those jobs have declined. The combination is oppressive for students and unsustainable for schools.
The brief letter notes a number of changes that might ameliorate this burden. All of those deserve exploration; I have posted on several already and will explore others in upcoming weeks. The letter, however, leaves a key point unstated: tenured professors at most schools will have to change their expectations if we hope to address this crisis. Faculty salaries and other perks account for a substantial share of the budget at most law schools. We can try to cut corners in other ways, by trimming staff and begging central administration to leave us a higher share of each tuition dollar. But in the end, we have to ask ourselves hard questions about the professional lives we’ve designed and the pay we demand.
Law professors earn high salaries, considerably higher than the pay drawn by most of our colleagues across the academy. Much of that money comes from the tuition paid by our students. With job and salary prospects down for lawyers, and with more transparency about those outcomes, fewer students are willing to pay our tuition. Faculty are going to have to adjust their financial expectations–and I think we should. We have enjoyed artificially high tuition and salaries for many years, due largely to our powerful economic status as gatekeepers to the legal profession. States didn’t create those restraints to enrich law schools, and we have served few interests (other than our own) by aggressively raising tuition and salaries over the last three decades.
In addition to lowering our financial expectations, faculty most likely will have to adjust the courses they teach, the ways in which they teach, and other professional activities. Distance education, for example, can help reduce the cost of legal education–but only if faculty are willing to use those techniques and then to consolidate courses across schools. One faculty member can teach Antitrust or Remedies to students at several law schools, but the faculty at those other schools must be willing to shift to other courses.
Adding apprenticeships and externships, similarly, will affect what current faculty do. We can’t expect students to pay for the full range of courses and scholarship our faculties now support plus the cost of apprenticeships or externships. These hands-on experiences will have to replace some of our current offerings, with traditional doctrinal faculty downsizing or taking on new duties.
Changes of this type are implicit in the letter from Concerned Colleagues, although I haven’t discussed these specifics with other signatories. Schools may find alternatives to the particular changes I’ve mentioned here; we need creativity to address the challenges before us. But it’s essential to avoid magic thinking when confronting those problems. The key difficulty for our graduates, students, and prospective students is that legal education has become too expensive for the career paths it supports. There is no magic solution to that problem in which we all become richer.
Student debt has risen to unprecedented levels. The total approached a trillion dollars by the end of 2012, and the figure continues to rise steeply. According to a recent report from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, student loans were the only type of household debt that continued to rise throughout the Great Recession.
Mortgage debt, which currently totals eight trillion dollars, still overshadows debt from student loans. But student debt now constitutes the second largest category of consumer debt, drawing the attention of economic forecasters.
Student debt provokes concern, not only because of its size, but because of increasing delinquency rates. Student loans now lead all other categories of consumer debt on non-payment: 11.7% of student loans are at least 90 days delinquent. Delinquency rates for student loans, furthermore, show a sharp upward trend (p. 9), while those for other types of household debt are declining.
Even those figures underestimate the looming shadow of student debt. As the Federal Reserve Report notes in footnote 2 of its report, “delinquency rates for student loans are likely to understate actual delinquency rates because almost half of these loans are currently in grace periods, in deferment, or in forebearance and therefore temporarily not in the repayment cycle.” The delinquency rate for student loans that have actually entered repayment is “roughly twice as high” as the 11.7% official rate. For more discussion of this issue, see this post on Liberty Street Economics, a blog authored by some of the economists working with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
So both student debt and delinquency rates on that debt are growing rapidly. What impact will those phenomena have on individuals and the economy? No one knows for sure, because our economy has no experience with student debt of this magnitude. The mechanics of student loans–which feature private and government lenders, deferral periods, and changing repayment plans–are also more complicated than other types of household debt.
Recent analyses by the economists at the NY Federal Reserve Bank, however, raise red flags about the impact of student debt. The economists found that “the growth in student loan balances and delinquencies was accompanied by a sharp reduction in mortgage and auto loan borrowing and other debt accumulation among younger age groups.” These declines were “greater for student loan borrowers and especially so for those with larger student loan balances,” suggesting a causal relationship. Highly indebted graduates, in other words, seem to be deferring home and car purchases. Those decisions have implications for both the individuals and the economy.
Higher education is an engine for economic growth; it enhances the productivity of most workers. But what happens to the economy when educators claim an increasing share of that productivity? The growth in student loan debt reflects dramatic increases in tuition at colleges and graduate programs. Those increases mean that educators are demanding, up front, a larger portion of the productivity gains they help students achieve. Many of today’s graduates, especially those with high professional school loans, will spend half their working lives repaying those debts. Rather than using their full productivity gains to invest in houses, cars, or the educational future of their own children, they will send a significant portion of each paycheck to their educational creditors. We don’t know yet how that shift will affect the economy, but the early returns are troubling.
UTX was my moment of epiphany, the “oh my” moment when cogent thought on the legal profession came in a flash. Admittedly, prior to learning of UTX (not that long ago), I didn’t really know much about the economics of the legal profession other than the obvious fact that the financial crisis of 2008-2009 must have inflicted significant pain on the industry, thus my prior assumption of only a cyclical downturn. I write this blog post for the benefit of those colleagues in the academy who may have a sense that the legal profession is having difficulties but can’t quite see the larger picture beyond anecdotes of layoffs and a very difficult hiring market. I hope to provide a concrete example of the economic stress on the legal profession, which obviously has trickle down effects on the economics of law schools and the value of the law degree. (more…)
Education is an investment. Until recently, Americans considered that investment close to fool-proof; almost every degree from a reputable institution seemed to pay off in the job market. With rising tuition and a turbulent economy, however, an increasing number of students understand that education today is like other investments: it has downside risk.
Legal educators often note that law isn’t the only field experiencing high tuition and uncertain job prospects; other graduate programs show the same trends. That’s true, but the question isn’t whether other programs are risky. The question is whether prospective students now perceive law school as more risky than other programs. It’s like the old story about the two campers and the bear. Other graduate programs don’t have to out-run the bear; they just need to out-run us.
The Risks
Here are some of the features that make legal education risky for today’s students. First, we maintain a three-year program. Students can obtain a wide range of master’s degrees in just two years–sometimes less with summer study. Master’s degrees in public affairs, public administration, public health, economics, social work, accounting, international relations, education, computer science, environmental science, and business are just some of the programs that might appeal to students interested in law.
Second, most of our programs are full-time. Part-time programs are much easier to find in many master’s fields, as well as in some doctoral programs. Full-time law students have limited options to earn money while pursuing their degrees; this increases the degree’s cost. Full-time enrollment may also discourage established workers from entering law school. In today’s volatile market, employees may be reluctant to cut ties as thoroughly as law school demands. Three years is a long gap in any employment history.
Third, our tuition is high. Law school costs substantially more than most master’s degrees, even without accounting for the third year. We also cost more than most PhD programs, especially since many doctoral students receive fellowship support or teach while earning their degrees. Medicine and dentistry cost more than law school, but they have much more secure job outcomes.
Fourth, our job outcomes are uncertain. For a worrisome number of graduates, there are no jobs practicing law. This reality emerges, not only from the 9-month employment statistics compiled by NALP, but also from Bureau of Labor Statistics projections. The Bureau estimates that, even if the economy returns to full strength, it will provide legal jobs for just half the number of students that law schools have been graduating.
It is true that some law graduates find satisfying work in fields other than law practice, but graduates of other programs fill those same jobs. Unless one wants to practice law, why pursue a degree that is more expensive and time-intensive than almost any other?
The job uncertainty, furthermore, extends to the type of law that a particular graduate may be able to practice. JDs practice many types of law, but that doesn’t mean that every JD can choose among all those paths. A top student at a top school probably can choose almost any route in law. The options, however, diminish steadily as one goes down the law school and class rank ladder. At least 80% of law students, for example, have no option to practice for an NLJ 250 firm; that’s simply not a choice for these students. The minority who can exercise that option aren’t necessarily the top graduates from the highest ranked schools–although they dominate this group. Some other students have this option because of special talents or background. My point here is that, for the large majority of students, this career path turns out not to be an option.
The same is true of many other legal positions. As the job market has contracted, and as high loans have made public service loan forgiveness very attractive, students can no longer count on careers as prosecutors, public defenders, or other government and public interest lawyers. I have seen excellent students compete desperately for these positions without success.
It’s one thing to choose law school knowing that you’ll accept a modest salary, and repay substantial loans, while doing work you love as a prosecutor. It’s another thing to choose law school knowing that you’ll have high debt combined with an uncertain menu of job choices. What if you invest all that time and money only to discover that your only options are small-firm family law practice or document review? Some graduates might enjoy those types of work but, if you went to law school wanting to be a prosecutor or other trial attorney, the pay off is disappointing compared to the investment.
These risks are particularly severe when put in the context of the overall job market. I recently discussed the changes that technology is unleashing on our economy. Given the accelerating impact of technology, it is hard to predict the parameters or income of any profession ten years from now. Certainly the economy will still support lawyers, but how many will it support? What will most of them do? And what will most of them be paid?
Against that backdrop, a rational college graduate might invest in a shorter, cheaper graduate degree than law. We are accustomed to thinking of the JD as flexible, but that may not be true in today’s economy. High debt alone reduces a graduate’s options. Today’s prospective applicant might think, “I’ll get a master’s degree in X and work in that field for a while. Maybe later I’ll see if law still makes sense.”
It’s hard to think of the JD as a risky degree; in earlier times, it seemed like one of the safest options for a college graduate wanting a professional career. But, if we want to address the dramatic decline in law school applicants, we need to put ourselves in the minds of those applicants. How do the risks of attending law school line up against the risks of other degree programs?
Remedies
Reducing the JD’s riskiness will be difficult, and it will require challenging steps for law schools. The best ways to reduce risk for law students are some combination of smaller class sizes, lower tuition, more part-time options, a shorter degree program, up-front commitments from employers (similar to medical residencies), or “stepped” programs that allow students to obtain a series of degrees enabling them to perform different types of legal work.
I don’t underestimate the difficulty, from a law school’s perspective, of making these changes. It seems, though, that recognizing the riskiness of a JD–compared to other graduate programs and workplace options–is an important step towards reshaping legal education in a way that will continue to attract talented future lawyers. We need to outrun those other campers.
In an article in the Journal of Legal Metrics, two Law School Transparency team members outline LST’s methodology for the LST Score Reports, an online tool designed to improve decisions by prospective law students. LST uses employment outcomes, projected costs, and admissions stats to help prospective students navigate their law school options.
Kyle McEntee and Derek Tokaz, the authors of both this paper and the online tool, resist the urge to rank schools on a national scale. Instead, they sort schools by where their graduates work post-graduation, allowing applicants to consider schools by geographic profile. The reports then use reader-friendly terms, like the percentage of graduates who secured full-time legal jobs, to help prospective students make educated decisions about which schools, if any, can meet their needs.
McEntee and Tokaz designed the reports to help prospective law students, but this article has important information for legal educators as well. The U.S. News rankings won’t disappear any time soon, but I think prospective students will begin looking at LST’s Score Reports in addition to the rankings. The reports contain more nuanced information, which prospective applicants will value; they also try to direct applicants into deeper exploration of their law school options.
As McEntee and Tokaz show, employment scores correlate imperfectly with U.S. News rank. As applicants begin to consider these scores, together with more transparent employment information on the schools’ websites, some schools will benefit while others suffer. Schools that under-perform their U.S. News score in job placement may want to explore why. Prospective students certainly will.
The other lesson for educators is that the vast majority of legal hiring is local. Students tend to stay in the city, state, and general region where they earned their law degree. As employers increasingly demand internships and unpaid apprenticeships, this trend may become even more dominant. It is hard to work part-time for a firm in one city while attending class in another. It’s far from impossible these days, with internet commuting, but students who lack face-time with prospective employers will be at a disadvantage. It’s also daunting to relocate after law school without a job in hand.
Law schools may find this information discouraging; most schools cherish their “national reputation” and want to extend it. It’s important to recognize, however, that the best job opportunities for graduates may be local ones. Time that a school spends promoting its national brand may deliver less return for graduates than time spent at local bar meetings.
On the bright side, schools should understand that a “national reputation” can co-exist with primarily local placement rates. That, in fact, is the reality for a vast number of law schools today. People around the country have heard about many law schools, even when those schools place most of their graduates locally. National reputation takes many forms and can pay off in many ways–even for graduates in later years. One lesson that I take from McEntee and Tokaz’s paper, however, is that schools should focus more diligently on their local, state, and regional reputations. That’s where the majority of job opportunities for graduates will lie.
Samuel Estreicher and Daniel Rodriguez published an op-ed in the New York Times discussing Estreicher’s idea of an optional third year of law school.
The ABA allows law schools to admit students who have completed just three years of college. Standard 502(a) provides that “A law school shall require for admission to its J.D. degree program a bachelor’s degree, or successful completion of three-fourths of the work acceptable for a bachelor’s degree, from an institution that is accredited by an accrediting agency recognized by the Department of Education.” This rule allows law schools to create “three/three” programs that admit students after three years of college. Students in these programs complete the normal three-year JD program, with their college applying one year of the JD study toward a BA degree. Students thus earn a BA and JD in a total of six years rather than seven.
According to a recent paper by Kyle McEntee, Patrick Lynch, and Derek Tokaz, thirteen law schools currrently advertise three/three programs. Those programs are:
Albany Law/Sage College
Chicago-Kent Law/Shimer College
Columbia University (scroll down)
Creighton University
Fordham University
Georgia State University
Florida Coastal Law/Jacksonville University
Hofstra University
Rutgers University-Camden
Seton Hall Law/NJ Institute of Technology
Southwestern Law/Cal State University
St. Thomas University
Willamette University (scroll down)
Many of the existing programs have strict limits. Creighton offers the option only to business students; Columbia chooses only one or two students a year. All thirteen of these programs, furthermore, reflect partnerships between a single college and a single law school–often under the same university umbrella. In this form, three/three programs serve very few students.
Should law schools expand three/three programs to encompass more students and schools? Here are some pros and cons:
Advantages of Three/Three Programs
1. For students, the programs reduce the cost of becoming a lawyer. Students devote just six years of higher education, rather than seven, to qualifying for the bar. They save a year of tuition and opportunity costs.
2. In most other countries, law is an undergraduate degree. From a systemic perspective, three/three programs could move the United States closer to parity with other nations. If U.S. students and new lawyers are disadvantaged by our longer education track, this change would assist them.
3. From a law school’s perspective, three/three programs may attract students who are otherwise reluctant to invest in law school.
4. Again from the school’s perspective, three/three programs may offer a way to “lock in” attendance by especially talented undergraduates at a partner school.
Disadvantages of Three/Three Programs
1. The programs do nothing to reduce the cost of legal education. As McEntee and his coauthors note in the paper cited above, three/three programs try to solve the problem of soaring law school tuition by cutting a year from college. Former law school dean and university president Gene Nichol sounded a similar theme while speaking at this year’s AALS meeting. Would it be healthier for law schools to address their costs more directly?
2. Unless three/three programs become dominant, the programs may do little to solve the problem of declining law school applications and enrollment. College seniors and graduates won’t care that a few other students saved money by enrolling in a three/three program; these potential applicants will continue to compare the cost of legal education to other graduate and workplace options. If high tuition and a diminished job market are discouraging students from attending law school, then schools need to find a way to address those problems for the bulk of their applicants–not just for a small number who matriculate through a three/three option.
3. The fourth year of college provides significant pedagogic value for many students. College seniors write undergraduate theses, pursue research projects with professors, and study abroad. Students who pursue three/three programs may miss these opportunities, hampering their personal development as well as the contributions they make to law schools and the workplace.
4. The students who would benefit most economically from three/three programs, those with few financial resources, may be the students who most need four years of college. Students from affluent backgrounds have the chance to take college-level courses in high school, travel abroad with their parents, and pursue other special programs before they set foot on a college campus. Less fortunate students only begin to catch up with these opportunities during college. Three/three programs may either give a bonus to wealthy students (who are educationally ready for law school after just three years of college) or further penalize disadvantaged students (who feel financially pressured to combine college and law school).
5. In a three/three program, the student saves a year of college tuition rather than one of law school tuition. If the student attends a low-cost college or has a substantial undergrad scholarship, the tuition savings may be small.
6. Although the ABA allows three/three programs, at least one state (Ohio) severely restricts the ability of these students to take the bar. Ohio’s Supreme Court Rule I.1(B) requires bar applicants to earn a bachelor’s degree (i) before beginning law school or (ii) “through completion of courses and credits other than those received in law school.” This rule precludes three/three applicants from gaining bar admission in Ohio unless their law school is willing to let them take a full year of credits outside the law school. I have not found any other state with this restrictive a rule, but schools or students considering three/three programs should look carefully at bar admission rules. For a quick guide to each state’s rules, check the Directory of Bar Admission Offices on the home page for the National Conference of Bar Examiners.
7. Current three/three programs offer students few, if any, choices among law schools. At least for now, the programs pair a single college and law school. A student who enrolls in one of these programs may sacrifice the opportunity to attend a more prestigious law school, one that would have offered a larger scholarship, or one with other attractions. The narrow focus of these programs similarly limits their utility to law schools. If a law school can strike a three/three partnership with only a few colleges, the number of students admitted under the three/three umbrella will be small.
8. Colleges may resist establishment of three/three programs because they (a) interfere with the liberal arts mission, and (b) reduce undergraduate revenues. Unless colleges are willing to endorse these programs, and to accept credits from a large number of law schools, the programs will remain small.
Unknowns
How will employers react to three/three graduates? Will they treat these students identically to other law students? Or will they find that three/three’s lack maturity or useful educational background? Some law students find jobs by combining undergraduate experiences–gained through externships, part-time jobs, or special study programs–with their law school degree. Will three/three students lack some of these opportunities?
On Balance
A three/three program may offer a useful option for a small number of students; my father obtained his Columbia BA and JD through a three/three program. But these programs seem unlikely to address the larger issues of cost associated with law school attendance. They may even interfere with full preparation of students for the workplace. Developing and administering any program takes time and money from a law school budget. Given the limited pay-off of three/three programs for schools and students, other innovations seem more promising than this one. But what do you think? What other costs and benefits have I missed?
Preliminary ABA figures show that entering JD class size fell 9% at ABA-accredited schools in the fall of 2012. The fall 2012 enrollment of 44,481 students was 15% lower than the historic high of 52,488 students enrolled in the fall of 2010. This year’s JD entering class is the lowest recorded since 2000, when 43,518 students began their first-year studies.
Some of this attrition was planned. The University of California’s Hastings College of the Law, for example, announced a class-size reduction as part of a comprehensive strategic plan. Other reductions were ad hoc, as schools struggled to find sufficient students after a rapid decline in applications.
We’re deep into another year of declining applications, and many schools are considering both their fall 2013 enrollment and their longer term plans. Entering class size plays an important role in any law school budget or strategic plan. What are the benefits and costs of reducing class size? I list below the considerations I’ve heard from faculty, students, and practitioners around the country.
Please add your thoughts in the comments; I will post an updated list after hearing your feedback. Rather than think through this issue in isolation, we can pool some of our insights here. The right approach for individual schools, of course, may vary widely. But what are the factors for schools to weigh?
Benefits of Reducing Class Size
1. Schools should adjust class size in accordance with the job market. Some observers advance this principle as a moral one, arguing that schools should not charge students for expensive degrees that they know their graduates will have difficulty using. Others adopt a pragmatic approach, noting that informed consumers follow the market: If fewer jobs are available, then fewer students will apply to law school. The market will reduce class sizes for schools, and they might as well adopt a pro-active stance.
2. As applications fall, a reduced class size may be essential to preserve the quality of the student body. Student quality affects classroom instruction, peer interaction, graduate quality, the school’s reputation, and–last but far from least–U.S. News ranking.
3. A reduced class size can improve instructional quality, extracurricular activities, and other aspects of the law school experience. Reducing class size, for example, will allow a school to offer clinical spots to a larger percentage of the class. Similarly, a higher percentage of students may be able to join journals, compete on moot court teams, enroll in popular seminars or simulations, interact closely with faculty, and find mentors among graduates.
4. Reducing class size might improve a school’s U.S. News ranking on several metrics. In addition to maintaining the credentials of entering students, a reduced class size usually will improve a school’s JD acceptance rate, student/faculty ratio, and expenditures per student. Down the road, a reduced class size may also improve placement success and bar passage rates. The change might also improve reputation among members of the bar, if those respondents perceive the action as improving the quality of a school’s graduates or as a responsible action on the school’s part.
5. If other schools reduce class size, then reductions may be necessary simply to keep up with those schools on the U.S. News metrics described above.
6. On-line instruction is advancing rapidly. As these programs improve, schools may be able to maintain a wide selection of courses–even with a smaller number of enrolled students and full-time faculty. To distinguish themselves in an on-line world, in fact, schools may need to offer many more hands-on courses featuring extensive interaction with faculty. Reducing class size now will prepare schools for that shift.
7. Reduced class sizes may allow schools to focus on the education that practitioners and students consider essential: hands-on experience in problem solving, counseling, writing, and the other tasks that form the core of law practice.
Costs of Reducing Class Size
1. If a school reduces class size but maintains its current budget, then tuition will rise for other students. Tuition and graduate debt already are too high. Increasing these burdens further may be professionally irresponsible (as argued by some observers) or counter-productive (if students choose cheaper schools or other career options).
2. Schools may not be able to provide as many educational opportunities to a smaller student base. Some seminars and smaller classes may fail to draw sufficient enrollment. Some student journals, moot court teams, and extracurricular activities may also lack sufficient participation.
3. This fall-off in participation may disproportionately affect newer additions to the law school curriculum. Students, for example, may continue to participate in appellate moot court teams–which have a long pedigree at most schools. They may under-subscribe counseling competitions, transactional meets, and other newer programs that would provide better educational value if they had a chance to gain acceptance.
4. Reducing enrollment is likely to reduce the number of minority, first-generation, and low-income students admitted to law school. Even if the percentages of those students remain steady, their absolute numbers will decrease. Should schools cut back on enrollment while these groups are still seeking access to the profession? Will smaller absolute numbers of students in these categories affect their critical mass? If these issues are a concern, will schools be able to increase the percentage of students admitted from these categories?
5. Some students, faculty, and alumni view size as strength. If a school cuts enrollment, these individuals may view the school as weak or lacking confidence in its quality compared to other schools.
6. If schools reduce class size (and their accompanying budgets), they may adjust course offerings to satisfy the tastes of tenured faculty. This may yield fewer clinics, simulations, and other experiential courses that students and practitioners find highly valuable.
7. No matter its size, every law school class has a bottom half, third, quarter, and ten percent. Reducing class size, in fact, may push more talented students into those lower ranges. If employers pay close attention to class rank–as many seem to have done in the past–then smaller class sizes may not improve employability for graduates. Even at the top of the class, fewer students will qualify for the top ten percent or top quarter.
Unknowns and Trade-Offs
1. If schools reduce size significantly (e.g., by enough to eliminate one first-year section), they may be able to reduce faculty size accordingly. The latter reduction would eliminate gains in student-faculty ratio or per-student expenditure, but it might prevent excessive tuition increases.
2. How does class size affect administrative costs? Law schools may realize economies of scale; functions like admissions, placement, and library services may be more expensive per student in a smaller school than a larger one. On the other hand, large schools may require more coordination (generating new administrative costs). It is also possible that in a smaller, less administrative-heavy organization, faculty would be more willing to take back some administrative functions.
What do you think? Please add to the discussion here:
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